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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
WILLIAM PARLEY SPRATLING and
DAISY SPRATLING,
Plaintiffs, Respondents,

v.

STATE OF UTAH, by and through its LAND
BOARD,
Defendant, Appellant.

Case No.
10947

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs are seeking quiet title to mineral rights
in land, the surface right to which they undisputibly
possess.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs initiated this action on July 12, 1966, by
filing the complaint herein pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated§ 78-11-9 (1953). Defendant was personally
served and answered. There being no issue of fact
to be determined, both plaintiffs and defendant
moved for summary judgment. The matter came on
for hearing on April 20, 1967, before the Honorable
Marcellus K. Snow, District Judge, sitting without a
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jury, at Salt Lake City, Utah. The matter was at thot
time taken under advisement.
On May 4, 1967, the court entered its order holding that plaintiffs were the owners in fee simple of
the property in question and that defendant, in effect, held no right, title, or interest in the minerals
thereon.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The lower court found an enforceable writte:1
contract to purchase lands which contained no reservation to the State of Utah of the minerals thereon.
Defendant seeks reversal of that determination or
in the alternative, a determination that the State has
taken the mineral rights in question by use of its
police power and therefore a finding that the State
of Utah is in fact the owner in fee of all mineral rights
in these lands.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The land inovlved in this dispute is situated in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more specifically,
Township 2 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, Section 28, Lots 5 and 6; Section 29, Lots 7 and 8.
On February 6, 1907, Mr. Charles J. Shoup and
Mr. Frederick D. Jaynes of Murray, Utah, executed
an Agreement to Purchase Selected Lands encompassing the lands herein. August 8, 1907, the Utah
Board of Land Commissioners, predecessor of defendant herein, accepted this agreement. There is
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no mention in this document of mineral rights although it does provide:
That after said lands shall have been seiected
by the State of Utah and a patent therefor has been
issued to the State by the authorized officers of the
United States, affiant will purchase the land at
private sale at the rate of two dollars and fifty cents
per acre on ten years time, in accordance with the
provisions of the law governing land sales.

The Board of Land Commissioners selected these
lands on selection list no. 1052 which was filed in
the United States Land Office, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on September 27, 1907. This selection was approved
by the United States Land Office on November 1,
1907, on approved Jist no. 89.
On September 29, 1908, the original selectors
assigned their rights to the lands in question to the
Garfield Smelting Company. On October 20, 1919,
the lands were found by the United States Department of the Interior to be subject to selection by the
State of Utah and not to be mineral in character. On
October 24, 1919, the United States Department of
the Interior approved selection by the State of Utah.
On June 2, 1920, the Utah State Land Board issued a certificate of sale to the Garfield Smelting
Company without reserving mineral rights to the
State of Utah, and on July 26, 1920, the Utah State
Land Board issued a patent thereon. Again there was
no reservation to the State of Utah of mineral rights
in the lands in question. The plaintiffs herein have
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succeeded to all right, title, and interest of the Garfield Smelting Company in the aforesaid land.
On January 28, 1964, the Utah State Land Board
filed for record in the office of the Salt Lake County
Recorder a Notice of Claim of the State of Utah to
all minerals within the lands in question, but in said
Notice there was a typogrnphical error designating
section 28 as section 38.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
MINERAL INTERESTS IN THE SUBJECT LAND TO
BE VESTED IN THE PLAINTIFFS.
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES SHOWS A RESERVATION TO THE STATE OF THESE MINERAL
RIGHTS.

A.

Appellant will show that the mineral rights in
the subject land are by law vested in the State of
Utah and by virtue of statute, the Utah State Land
Board has control of these mineral rights. There is
no dispute that if the State of Utah does in fact own
the mineral rights in question, the Utah State Land
Board by virtue of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. j
65-1-14 (1951) has disposition of it.
The applicable law coupled with the intent of
the parties make it clear that respondents herein
have no valid claim to the mineral rights in these
lands. There is no question that respondents have
fee title to the surface of these lands.
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The intent of the parties is shown in the wording of the Agreement to Purchase Selected Lands
executed on February 6, 1907, and approved by the
Utah State Board of Land Commissioners on August
S, 1907. That document recites in part:
That after said lands shall have been selected
by the State of Utah and a patent therefore has been
issued to the State by the authorized officers of
the United States, affiant will purchase the land at
private sale at the rate of two dollars and 50 cents
per acre on 10 years time, in accordance with the
provisions of the law governing land sales. (emphasis
added)

There is no illegality in binding oneself to future laws. Although in general parties are deemed
to contract with reference to the state of the law as
it exists at the time of making the contract, there is
nothing to prevent them from doing so with reference to a state of the law which does not then exist,
particularly where it appears by the terms of the
agreement that changed conditions of the law might
reasonably be expected. People ex rel Platt v. Wemple, 117 N.Y. 136, 22 NE 1046 (1889).
It is agreed that the sale to respondents' antecedents in interest occured on July 26, 1920, with the
issuance of the patent covering these lands to the
Garfield Smelting Company. The law governing
land sales in ] 920 was expanded by Utah Laws 1919,
ch. 107 § 1 which is now found as Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann.§ 65-1-14, to -17 (1961).

For clarity, appellant will refer to these enactments by section number of the Compiled Laws of

6

Utah, 191 7, as amended. Section 55 75 gave the Board
of Land Commissioners exclusive direction, management and control of all lands theretofore or thereafter granted to the State by the United States government. Sections 557Sx and 5575xl are the two requiring interpretation in this case. These are set
forth in full as follows:
5575x. Mineral lands. All coal and other mineral deposits in lands belonging to the State are
hereby reserved to the State. Such deposits are reserved from sale except upon a rental and royalty
basis as herein provided and the purchaser of any
land belonging to the State shall acquire no right,
title or interest in or to such deposits, and the right
of such purchaser shall be subject to the reservation
of all coal and other mineral deposits and to the
conditions and limitations prescribed by law providing for the State and persons authorized by it to
prospect for, mine, and remove such deposits and to
occupy and use so much of the surface of said land
as may be required for all purposse reasonably incident to the mining and removal of such deposits
therefrom.
5575x1. Purchases-reservation-certificates.
All applications to purchase approved subsequent to
the passage of this Act shall be subject to a reservation to the State of all coal and other mineral deposits in said land and with the right to the State
or persons authorized by it to prospect for, mine
and remove the same as provided by law, and, all
certificates of sale issued therefrom shall contain
such reservation.

This enactment was made effective May 12,
1919, and was therefore the "law governing land
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sales" at the date of the purchase in 1920. The applicable portion of section 5575x provides:
ALL coal and other mineral deposits in lands
belonging to the State are hereby reserved to the
State. Such deposits are reserved from sale ... and
the purchaser of any land belonging to the State
shall acquire no right, title or interest in or to such
deposits and the right of such purchaser shall be
subject to the reservation of all coal and other mineral deposits. (emphasis added)

Therefore, the instrument by which the respondents' interest arose is clear in applying the
above quoted statute to any sale arising therefrom.
The respondents should not now be allowed to
escape their contractual obligations of having the
mineral interests reserved in the State of Utah and
this court should so hold as a matter of law.
B. EXERCISE OF THE STATE'S POLICE POWER IS
SUFFICIENT TO ABROGATE PRIOR CONTRACTURAL
RELATIONSHIPS WHEN THE INTENT TO DO SO IS
CLEAR.

The trial court apparently held that there was a
fully executed contract in effect on August 8, 1907,
and since no reservation of mineral interests to the
State of Utah was shown thereon, any subsequent
legislation could not alter these "vested rights" because such statutes as applied to contract rights of
respondent's predecessors in interest would amount
to an unconstitutional impairment of contract.
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-32 (1961) allows an individual to make application with the Utah State Land
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Board to purchase lands from the State of Utah which
may be selected by the State from the United States
in satisfaction of land grants to the State of Utah.
This provision was enacted originally in 1899. Laws
of Utah, 1899, Ch. 64, § 14.

The applications in effect in 1907 provided that
the State of Utah would sell the land only after it
had been patented to the State. The application was
merely an expectation and offer on the part of the
applicant that, in the event selection was approved,
he would purchase the lands if sold. The applicant
obtained no vested rights in the land prior to the
time the contract of sale was entered into.
In Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 Pac. 534 (1900),
a suit was brought by an applicant for the purchase
of selection lands, contending that the application
gave him a right in the lands which the board could ,
not ignore. The court rejected the contention and
found that the applicant has no rights until the contract is actually formed. As this court stated at 22
Utah 64, 61 Pac. 537:
Under the statute, after an application for lands is
made, until the selection is made, and the price to
be paid, and the time in which the deferred payments shall be made are fixed by the board, and
assented to by the applicant, and a contract of sale
containing the stipulation agreed upon is executed,
the applicant has no vested rights whatever. The
petition fails to state a cause of action.

Consequentlv. an application made in 190'7
would not grant -the applicant any vested interest
which could not be changed by contract or statute.
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As was shown in Point A., the Utah State Land Board
could not, subsequent to May 12, 1919, enter into
any contract or grant any patent covering lands
which did not reserve the minerals to the State.
Therefore, a contract entered into after that date
which did not contain a mineral reservation was
ultra vires and the statutory reservation would govern.

It cannot be contended that there is any constitutional objection under the contract clause of the
Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section
10, or the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 1,
Section 18. First, it is apparent that an application
entered into in 1907 would give the applicant no
vested rights, and, therefore, not be within the scope
of the consitutional protection to rights in contract.
Secondly, a contract entered into in 1920, to the extent that it failed to contain the statutory reservation,
would be ultra vires, and as a matter of law subject
to the reservation, in consequence of which there
was no valid contract for the transfer of the mineral
estate.
It is well settled that the contract clause in both
the Utah State and United States Constitutions is subjec to the police power and the dominant interest
of the State in protecting its economic interest.

In Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934), the United States Supreme
Court observed:
Not onlv is the constitutional provision qualified by
the me~sure of control which the State~retains over -
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remedial process, but the State also continues to
possess authority to safeguard the vital interests
of its _People. It does not matter that legislation appropriate to that end "has the result of modifying
or abrogating contracts already in effect" Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1S32). Not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read
into contracts as a postulate of the legal order ...
This principle of harmonizing the constitutional
prohibition with the necessary residium of state
power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this Court.

At 290 U.S. 437:
The economic interest of the State may justify the
exercise of its continuing and dominant protective
power notwithstanding interference with contracts.

The term "police power" was defined by the
United States Supreme Court in Manigault v.
Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) as follows: "That
power is an exercise of the sovereign right of the
Government to protect the general welfare of the
people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts betv·rnen individuals. Once in this domain oi
the reserve power of the State the court must respect
the "wide discretion on the part of the legislature in
determining what is and what is not necessary."
East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230,
232 (1945).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that
the police power takes precedence over the contract
clause. State Road Comm'n of Utah v. Utah Power
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& Light Co., 10 Utah2d 333, 353 P.2d 171 (1960). Kent

Club v. Toronto. 6 Utah2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957).
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court,
in a case which bears substantial similarity to the
question posed in the instant case, found no impairment of the contract clause to the Constitution.
In El Paso v. Simmons. 379 U.S. 497 (1965), a
quiet title action was brought by the City of El Paso
against the assignee of a redemption right under a
Texas state land contract. At the time the contract
was entered into, the State Land Commissioner of
Texas sold the property subject to the statutory provision which was incorporated in the contract that,
upon default, the purchaser would have a perpetual
right of redemption. Subsequent to the contract, the
Texas Legislature amended the law, restricting the
redemption right to five years. On appeal before
the United States Supreme Court, it was contended
that the subsequent amendment to the Texas law
could not interfere with the contractual right of redemption in existence at the time the contract had
been entered into. The United States Supreme Court
ruled to the contrary, finding that the police power
interests of the State of Texas, clearing titles to state
lands and protecting their economic interests and
the state school fund, were paramount to the contract clause.
In the instant situation, it is clear that the interests of the State of Utah in reserving mineral
rights, protecting the uniform school fund, and preserving the economic interests of the State are a
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valid exercise of the police power. Therefore, there
is no merit to any contention that there is a vested
contractual right to the mineral estate by a pre-1919
selection applicant.
CONCLUSION
The appellant has shown that the intent of the
parties was to be bound by the state law governing
contracts, that this law has vested mineral rights in
state land to the State of Utah, that there are no
vested rights of respondents to be protected, and
finally that the police power of the state in attempting
to protect an economic interest can abrogate con·
tractual relationships in conflict with it. Therefore,
appellant would request this court to reverse the
finding of the trial court and hold that all mineral
interests in the lands in question are vested in the
State of Utah and that respondents herein have no
rights to them whatsoever.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
LEROY S. AXLAND
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellant

